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Abstract:The network effect is the general principle 
that the value of connecting to a network depends on 
the number of existing customers in the network. 
Usually, the network effect makes strong firms 
stronger and weak firms weaker. In e-commerce, 
however, the power of network effects can be miti-
gated when users adopt multiple transaction platforms 
(i.e., multiple adoption). Owing to multiple adoption, 
emerging firms have a chance to compete with or 
surpass strong incumbents. This empirical study 
showed that, because of multiple adoption, smaller 
players can still exist in the face of a dominant player 
in China’s competitive online auction platforms.  
Keywords: Network effect, e-commerce, multiple 
adoption, online auction. 
 
1. Introduction 
In network economics, network effect refers to the 
general principle that the value in connecting to a 
network increases with the number of users already in 
the network. The networks can be physical, such as 
telephone networks, or virtual, such as the networks of 
the members of a Web site or the networks of the users 
of a computer system. Because of network effect, 
larger networks are more valuable to users than 
smaller ones. Users thus tend to prefer larger networks 
to smaller ones, which makes larger networks even 
larger. This self-reinforcement nature makes the strong 
firms stronger and the weak firms weaker.  To an 
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extreme, a market characterized by network effects is 
usually expected to be taken by a monopoly [7] [10] 
[12]. Network effect has been influential in the com-
petition between technological standards in network 
industries, such as information, telecommunication 
and consumer electronics industries [20]. Well-known 
examples include the war between Wintel and Apple 
computers (Wintel is a dominant market leader and 
Apple is a niche player), the war of VHS and Beta 
video recorders (VHS succeeded and Beta failed), and 
recently the war between blue-ray DVD and HD DVD 
(blue-ray DVD is now dominating). 
The impact of network effect still carries over to 
electronic commerce [16]. In electronic commerce, 
the first-mover advantage chiefly comes from net-
work effect, and this is especially true for the in-
fo-mediary business such as online auctions and on-
line recruiting services. With more buyers and sellers 
(or employers and applicants), the website offers 
more chances of successful transactions (or employ-
ments). Thus the value of participating in a larger 
auction (recruitment) website is higher, and users 
tend to prefer larger sites to smaller ones, which 
makes larger sites even larger. Empirical evidences 
include the competitions between eBay and Ya-
hoo!Auction in North America (where eBay is the 
winner) and in Japan (where Yahoo!Auction beats 
eBay). 
Nevertheless, a fundamental difference exists 
between e-commerce and other network industries: 
multiple adoption of products or services. In informa-
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tion or telecommunication industries, the cost can be 
prohibitively high for general consumers to buy one 
Apple computer and one Wintel computer, or sub-
scribe simultaneously to two or more cell phone ser-
vices. Therefore, users are forced to take exclusive 
adoption by participating in just one network. In 
e-commerce, however, the cost can be sufficiently 
low to allow users to adopt two or more networks. 
For general users, the cost is merely applying for an 
account in multiple websites. We term this phenome-
non as multiple adoption.  
In e-commerce, therefore, the winner may not 
always take all the market and challengers can still 
have a chance to survive and grow. For example, 
Yahoo!Kimo Auction is the leading auction site in 
Taiwan, but the new entrant ruten.com competes 
with Yahoo!Kimo Auction and survives [17]. In ad-
dition, most users of ruten.com are multiple adopters 
who adopt both Yahoo!Kimo Auction and ru-
ten.com simultaneously [18]. Since C2C platforms 
are one of the major online purchasing channels [19] 
and the size of C2C electronic market in China is 
much larger than that in Taiwan, it is interesting to 
examine whether and how multiple adoption occurred 
in China. 
In this study, we examine the market situation of 
C2C auction sites in China, and explore the following 
questions:  
(1) Whether multiple adoption occurs (i.e., users 
adopt multiple auction sites simultaneously)? 
(2) Why and why not users adopt multiple auction 
sites? 
(3) Is multiple adoption an intermediate phase to 
exclusive adoption? 
 
2. Literature Review 
There is a rich literature on network effects. For ex-
ample, Katz and Shapiro [7] proposed the term posi-
tive consumption externality and defined it as the 
utility a user derives from consumption increases with 
the number of other users consuming the good. Later 
on, Choi et al. [2] argued that network externality is no 
longer an externality if a market price already reflects 
the price of an external benefit or loss, and proposed 
that the term network effects can better describe the 
targeted phenomenon than network externality. This 
study adopts this suggestion and uses network effects 
to describe the phenomenon. 
Recent works on network effects examined nu-
merous topics, including product launch strategies 
[11], pricing strategies [5], innovation and strategic 
activities[4] [5], the customer-capturing strategy for 
replacing leading technologies [13], and compatibility 
strategies [20]. Some researchers extended the theory 
of network effects to two-sided markets such as auc-
tions and recruiting services [1] [8] [9].  
Unfortunately, previous works were mostly 
based on the simple assumption that consumers adopt 
one network at a time. In reality, however, users may 
adopt more than one network simultaneously. We 
termed this phenomenon as multiple adoption [14] 
[15]. Some other researchers introduced similar terms 
such as multihoming [3] to describe this situation, 
and discussed various strategies in the context of 
multiple adoption. However, these works are mostly 
theoretical models in economics rather than extensive 
empirical studies. The purposes of this paper are 
therefore: (1) providing empirical evidence for mul-
tiple adoption to enhance the theoretical research 
models, and (2) providing information and sugges-
tions for challengers to take advantage of multiple 
adoption for survival and growth. 
 
3. Background and Methodology 
Established in 1999, Eachnet was China’s earliest and 
largest C2C auction site. In 2002, eBay partnered with 
Eachnet to establish eBayEachnet, but soon faced 
tough competition from China’s local start-up Taobao, 
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which was set up in 2003. In 2006, Taobao surpassed 
eBayEachnet and become China’s largest C2C plat-
form. In 2009, eBayEachnet exited from China’s C2C 
market and transformed into a service company for the 
purchase of oversees products. Currently, Taobao is 
the largest C2C auction site in China, followed by 
PaiPai, which was established in 2006. 
The questionnaire was designed to understand 
how users adopt the two major auction sites in China
－Taobao and PaiPai, with special emphasis on 
whether and how users have multiple adoption. Be-
cause auction is a two-sided market connecting buy-
ers and sellers, the questionnaire deliberately identi-
fied three types of users: pure buyers, pure sellers, 
and mixed users (i.e., buyer and sellers). The ques-
tionnaire was proofread by 5 graduate students who 
were savvy users of online auction websites, and a 
pretest was then conducted for further correction and 
modification. After this, the printed questionnaire was 
disseminated in five classes, one is MBA students and 
the others are undergraduate students, all of them are 
students at a university in China. A total of 170 valid 
responses were collected. 
 
4. Data Analysis 
We distinguish and categorize users by two dimen-
sions: activities in auctions websites and memberships 
in auction websites. 
According to chief activities, there are three 
kinds of users: (1) pure buyers: buying goods without 
selling goods; (2) pure sellers: selling goods without 
buying goods; (3) mixed users: buying goods and 
selling goods. For ease of discussion, pure buyers and 
pure sellers are collectively termed as pure users. 
According to membership, there are two kinds of 
users: (1) exclusive adopters: using either Taobao or 
PaiPai, but not both; (2) multiple adopters: using 
both Taobao and PaiPai. 
 
4.1 Sample Profile 
Table 1 shows the sample profile. Of the 170 
samples, 116 (68.2%) are female and 54 (32.8%) are 
male. Their ages are mostly between 21 and 30 
(66.5%) or under (including) 20 (32.3%). Almost all 
of them (169 out of 170) have collegiate degrees or 
higher. Most of them (162 or 95.3%) are students. 
Most of them (130 or 76.5%) have experience in on-
line auctions for one year or more. There are 163 
(95.9%) pure buyers, 5 (2.9%) mixed users, one 
(0.6%) pure seller, and one bystander (browsing on-
ly). 
 
4.2 Adoption of Auction Websites 
Of the 170 samples, 158 (92.9%) adopted Taobao 
exclusively, 1 (0.6%) adopted PaiPai exclusively, and 
11 (6.5%) adopted both websites. Moreover, all 11 
multiple adopters are pure buyers, and all joined 
Taobao first and then PaiPai, which means that PaiPai 
is starting to erode the business of Taobao. However, 
this also means that most customers of PaiPai are not 
new (distinct) consumers. Rather, they are multiple 
adopters coming from the rival auction website Tao-
bao. This implies that for new entrant firms such as 
PaiPai, attracting multiple adopters may be an impor-
tant marketing strategy. 
 
4.3 Why and Why Not Multiple Adoption 
As shown in Table 2, the three main reasons for mul-
tiple adoption, in order, are: (1) looking for more 
transactions, (2) seeking special goods, and (3) 
searching for more information about products and 
prices. 
Note the order of the reasons reverses the find-
ing in Taiwan [18]. This may reflect that buyers in 
China’s are more active or aggressive in purchasing 
than Taiwan’s buyers, supporting the fact that C2C 
market in China is growing drastically and more 
competitive. 
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As shown in Table 3, for the 158 exclusive 
adopters using only Taobao, the chief reasons for not 
adopting multiple auction sites are: (1) having been 
used to the interface of Taobao (39.9%), (2) there are 
more members in Taobao (30%), and (3) they have 
established trading partners (14.6%). Note that the 
first and the third reasons are the lock-in effect [10] 
and the second reason is a case of the network effect. 
Clearly, Taobao has obtained first-mover advantage 
relative to PaiPai. 
 
Table1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Study Participants 
  Count % 
Gender Male 54 32.8 
 Female 116 68.2 
Age  20 (years) 55 32.3 
 21 ≦ age ＜ 30 113 66.5 
 ≥ 30 2 1.2 
Job Student 162 95.3 
 Teacher 4 2.4 
 Others 4 2.4 
Online auction experience < 1 year 40 23.5 
 ≥ 1 yr and < 3 yrs 96 56.5 
 ≥ 3 yrs 34 20.0 
Chief activities Pure buyer 163 95.9 
 Pure seller 1 0.6 
 Buyer and seller 5 2.9 
 Others 1 0.6 
 
Table 2. Reasons for Multiple Adoption 
Reason Frequency % 
looking for more transactions 5 45.5%
seeking special goods 3 27.3%
searching for more information about products and prices 2 18.2%
others 1 9.1% 
 
Table 3. Reasons for Not Multiple Adoption 
Reason Frequency % 
having been used to the interface of Taobao 63 39.9% 
more members in Taobao 59 37.3% 
with established trading partners 23 14.6% 
others 13 8.2% 
4.4 Multiple Adoption as a Transition Phase to 
Exclusive Adoption 
For the 158 exclusive users of Taobao, we fur-
ther investigated whether they ever used eBayEach-
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Net, and if yes, how they become exclusive users of 
Taobao. Of the 158 users, 14 of them ever used 
eBayEachNet. Five of these 14 users adopted 
eBayEachNet initially, then adopted both BayEach-
Net and Taobao (i.e., multiple adoption), and finally 
only Taobao. Four of these 14 users adopted Taobao 
initially, then both BayEachNet and Taobao (i.e., 
multiple adoption), and finally only Taobao. Five of 
these 14 users adopted eBayEachNet initially, and 
then directly switched to Taobao exclusively. From 
this fact, we see that multiple adoption can serve as a 
transition phase to exclusive adoption. 
 
5. Discussion 
From the above analysis, we have the following ob-
servations: 
1. Network effects can result in first-mover ad-
vantage for incumbents. Therefore, the get-big-fast 
strategy must be pursued to build a larger customer 
base. Meanwhile, consumers’ multiple adoption of 
online services still gives starting firms a chance to 
survive and even surpass incumbent firms. 
2. Consumers are variety seekers, ready to have 
novel experiences, and eager for more information to 
reduce uncertainties and ensure fairness in trade. A 
single dominant player in online business is not fully 
favorable to consumers, and consumers are welcom-
ing new firms to enter the market. 
3. New entrant firms can attract customers if 
they can provide valuable information, special goods, 
and facilitate transaction processes. 
4. The revenue of online auction websites comes 
from several sources, such as selling advertisements, 
transaction fees, product registration fees, and mem-
bership fees. For stronger firms, charging fees for 
membership or transaction may be acceptable to most 
customers, although this may lose some business to 
competitors. For startup firms, the revenue should 
chiefly come from selling advertisements, and there-
fore, they must find ways to attract a significant 
number of web users to visit their sites to gain more 
bargaining power with advertisers. 
5. It is important to note that although users can 
gain benefits (such as gathering more information, 
finding more items, achieving more transactions) 
from multiple adoption, they have to pay costs (such 
as time cost, energy cost, and/or money) for multiple 
adoption. New entrant firms, therefore, should not 
only find ways to provide more benefits to multiple 
adopters but also reduce their costs of multiple adop-
tion so that multiple adopters will gain net profit in 
multiple adoption. 
6. To reduce uncertainly and risks, users may not 
wish to abandon original supplier all at once to switch 
to a new supplier. Rather, users may adopt both orig-
inal supplier and new supplier for some time, where 
multiple adoption occurs. Therefore, new suppliers 
may facilitate or encourage multiple adoption for us-
ers as a less risky transition phase toward exclusively 
adopting new suppliers. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we conducted an empirical study on the 
behavior of online auction users to understand how 
network effects and multiple adoption interact to in-
fluence the competition between the two major auc-
tion websites in China. We also examined whether 
multiple adoption could be a transition phase to ex-
clusive adoption.  
We found that a larger customer base can result 
in stronger network effects and gives the incumbent 
the competitive advantage, but users still adopt mul-
tiple auction websites, giving smaller firms a chance 
to thrive.  
Here are suggestions for both the incumbent and 
starting firms in electronic commerce:  
(1) The incumbent firm (market leader) should 
seek ways that add more value to the current con-
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sumers to increase the lock-in effect on them. As 
more customers are retained, the network effects will 
be stronger and the incumbent will enjoy more com-
petitive advantage. 
(2) The starting firm, on the other hand, should 
seek ways that encourage consumers to take multiple 
adoption to attract customers from the market leader. 
In addition, multiple adoption may also occur in 
other online platforms such as job websites and on-
line gaming [21]. For example, an employer (or job 
seeker) may adopt more than one job website to post 
job openings (or to find jobs). The findings in this 
paper may also offer some insights in these online 
industries.  
For other technology-based services, multiple 
adoption may serve as a transition phase from exist-
ing technologies to new technologies. That is, before 
completely replacing existing technologies, new 
technological facilities may co-exist with existing 
technological facilities to reduce the anxieties or risks 
in using new technologies. For example, when intro-
ducing the emerging NFC (near field communication) 
services such as contacless smart cards or contactless 
payment, service providers should allow users to use 
either NFC-enabled smart phones or traditional cards. 
This would make the transition from existing tech-
nologies to new technologies smoother. 
Overall, this empirical study made a confirma-
tion to the theoretical frameworks of Teng et al. [14] 
and Doganoglu and Wright [3] on multiple adoption. 
Future theoretical research can be conducted to refine 
and extend theoretical models based on the evidence 
provided by this paper, and future empirical research 
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